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1. Preliminaries 
 
As a linguistic category, evidentiality refers to the linguistic coding of the information source a 
speaker has for his or her statements. In other words, evidentiality refers to the linguistic coding of 
what we know and how/why (see, e.g., Aikhenvald 2004: 1, for a more detailed discussion of the 
term, see Boye 2018). Our statements may be, e.g., based on visual evidence, or we may only have 
hearsay evidence for a given claim. Evidentiality can be viewed as both semantic and formal category. 
Semantically, evidentiality can be considered a universal category in that all languages can take 
account of the speaker’s information source somehow, for example, lexical verbs such as ‘see’ and 
‘hear’ can be used for this in case language lacks evidentiality as a grammatical category. Oher 
languages, such as Wutun and Tsafiki (see (4) and (5)), in turn, express evidentiality by 
grammaticalized morphemes, e.g., verbal affixes. In languages where evidentiality is expressed by, 
e.g., lexical verbs, evidentiality is usually optional, while languages like Wutun express evidentiality 
obligatorily. Most of the earlier research on evidentiality has focused on languages with 
grammaticalized evidentiality (see, e.g., Chafe & Nichols (eds.) 1986 and Aikhenvald & Dixon (eds) 
2003), but recently, there has been a shift in focus, and more research has been done on languages 
such as German, Spanish and English (see, e.g., Diewald & Smirnova (eds.) 2010 and Diewald & 
Smirnova 2010). We may thus say that evidentiality is nowadays viewed more from a 
semantic/functional perspective and the exact nature of evidentiality expression is less relevant. This 
view is adopted also in this chapter, and no major distinctions are made between languages based on 
the nature of their evidentiality expression. This follows because the goal of this chapter is to discuss 
evidentiality as broadly as possible. 
 Evidentiality is closely related to modality, a category better known due to its frequent 
occurrence in more extensively studied and more widely spoken languages of Europe (see, e.g., 
Cornillie 2009 for a discussion of these notions). Both of these categories are related to how certain 
the speaker finds his/her claims to be. For example, both visual evidentials (used whenever the 
speaker is basing his/her claims on something s/he has seen) and indicative mood (used whenever the 
speaker finds a state-of-affairs probable based on the available evidence) are used when the speaker 
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finds the state-of-affairs s/he is referring to likely. However, the two categories differ clearly in how 
the certainty is motivated; in a nutshell, evidentiality is more objective and modality more subjective 
in nature (see Section 2 for a more detailed discussion). Pragmatics is thus more relevant to (especially 
epistemic) modality, while evidentiality is more semantically determined, even though, as the 
discussion below will show, pragmatics plays an important role for evidentiality as well. 
 Even though evidentiality is best defined as the speaker’s information source, it is important to 
note that many other features contribute to what kind of evidential the speaker uses. First, the speaker 
is constantly monitoring what s/he expects the hearer to know (or even what the hearer is obliged to 
know), and chooses his/her evidentials accordingly (see Bergvist 2015). Second, in some cases, the 
right to know or engagement and access of information better captures the nature of evidentials (see, 
e.g., Evans et al 2018). For example, in Wutun lamas are seen to have access to information that is 
restricted for other people (see (4) below and Sandman 2016: 224). In these kinds of case, the speaker 
is not free to choose his/her evidentials completely freely, but other features need to be taken into 
account as well. Finally, as will be shown in Section 5, evidentials have other functions not directly 
related to the expression of information source.  
 In this chapter, some of the central facets of evidentiality will be discussed from a pragmatically 
oriented perspective (even though semantics also plays an important role). Evidentiality has recently 
become a popular topic of research in linguistics (even though pioneering work has been done decades 
ago, see, e.g., Chafe & Nichols (eds.) 1986), which has the very natural consequence that the field 
has become rather vast. Thus, only a part of all possible aspects can be considered in this brief 
overview (the interested reader is referred to Aikhenvald (ed) 2018 for detailed studies of different 
aspects of evidentiality). The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I will discuss the 
relation of evidentiality and modality. This will be followed by an illustration of the information 
sources in Section 3. Section 4 examines the effects of context on the use of evidentials by discussing 
engagement, epistemic authority and right to know, while extended/non-evidential functions of 
evidentials will be the focus of Section 5. Acquisition of evidentials will be discussed in Section 6, 
and Section 7 briefly summarizes the most relevant points of this chapter. 
 
 
2. Modality and evidentiality 
 
As noted above, evidentiality refers to the linguistic coding of the speaker’s information source; how 
we know what we know/claim. Modality (especially epistemic modality), for its part, can be seen as 
the linguistic coding of the speaker’s assessment of the likelihood of the occurrence of a given states-
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of-affairs (see Kiefer 1998 and Palmer 1986 for more detailed discussions of modality). Both notions 
are intimately associated with the likelihood of a given state-of-affairs, but the probability is 
motivated very differently. As regards evidentiality, the nature of evidence directly determines how 
likely an event or state is, and the speaker’s own evaluation is less important. On the other hand, the 
speaker’s own (subjective) evaluation is always relevant to modality, even though the speaker is 
naturally using the information available to him/her as a basis for his/her evaluation.  (Epistemic) 
Modality is thus best defined as the speaker’s subjective evaluation of the probability of a state-of-
affairs, while evidentiality can be defined as the evidence type the speaker has for his/her claim (see 
Cornillie 2009 for a discussion of the notions of modality and evidentiality). 
 In principle, all our claims are based on some kind of evidence (which may be totally absent in 
a given situation, as is the case, e.g., with general knowledge, see Kittilä 2019), and modality and 
evidentiality represent different ways of dealing/conceptualizing the evidence we have. Evidentiality 
is more directly related to the evidence itself and evidentiality markers directly code the type of 
evidence we have for our statements. We cannot label a given marker as an evidentiality marker if it 
does not account for the evidence type in any way. Modality, for its part, is not in any direct way 
associated with the evidence type, and, for example, the use of indicative mood does not say anything 
about the evidence type the speaker is basing his/her claim on. It only conveys the message that the 
speaker finds the denoted state-of-affairs likely, but it is totally silent on the evidence type. The 
speaker is, naturally, more likely to use indicative mood for statements based on visual evidence, but 
s/he is free to use indicative (or any realis) mood also for statements based on hearsay in case s/he 
finds the evidence reliable enough. Languages differ according to whether they stress the nature of 
evidence or the speaker’s judgement; the first type is represented by languages with evidentiality, 
while the second type is illustrated by languages that code modality obligatorily (e.g., by grammatical 
mood). For example, if both speaker A and speaker B have heard from C that John is coming, they 
are both going to use hearsay evidential if they speak a language that obligatorily codes evidentiality. 
On the other hand, they may use different moods/modal markers (e.g. John is coming, or John might 
be coming) according to how reliable they find C’s evidence to be.  
 Modality and evidentiality clearly differ from each other in their subjective vs. objective nature, 
but the two notions have in common that variation in the use of different markers is less dramatic for 
highly reliable (typically, e.g., visual) evidence. This follows rather naturally for evidentiality, 
because evidentiality is primarily about the nature of evidence, but a similar claim can also be made 
for modality. For example, the speaker is highly likely to use indicative mood, and thus present his/her 
claim as reliable, when s/he has visual evidence for his/her claim. In this case, the evidence is very 
reliable and hard to deny, and the use of other moods would thus be deemed odd. On the other hand, 
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there is more variation for hearsay evidence, because the speaker always has to evaluate him/herself 
whether s/he finds the person responsible for a given claim reliable or not. The effects of pragmatics 
are clearly less drastic, yet not inexistent, for evidentiality, because the nature of evidence we have 
for our statements varies depending on context, and some evidence types are more prone to pragmatic 
interpretations than others. The effects become visible the less reliable and direct the speaker’s 
evidence becomes; less direct evidence leaves more room for speculation. 
Even though most of our claims (with the notable exceptions of lies and fiction) are based on 
some kind of evidence that may be contextually present or not, a clearly smaller percentage of 
languages have grammaticalized the expression of evidentiality, but grammatical mood seems to be 
more frequent across languages. This is, however, probably not a mere co-incidence, but we can make 
a case for the more frequent occurrence of grammatical modality. From the hearer’s perspective it is 
relevant to know whether the speaker is able to take responsibility for his/her claims, which is more 
directly reflected in the choice of the modal expression. Certainty is an integral part of the semantics 
of modals, while with evidentials certainty is only an implication. Moreover, the speaker may not be 
totally sure about his/her source of information, but s/he can nevertheless evaluate the degree of 
his/her certainty for a given claim. Source of information, purely objectively, is only one, yet highly 
relevant, part of this evaluation process. Direct evidence may also be contextually present, which 
makes its overt expression less relevant, while the speaker’s evaluation is never fully retrievable from 
any available cues. These differences are also formally/lexically manifest. For example, Finnish, 
where coding of evidentiality is optional, has (in addition to grammatical mood) a variety of modal 
particles that can also be used for coding emphasized certainty. In contrast, there is no evidential 
particle for direct information, but only particles for inference, assumption, hearsay and quotation. 
Zero is the default form used whenever the speaker has no reason to mark the information source, 
and its use implies that the speaker has direct (and reliable) evidence for his/her claim. However, 
despite the more detailed/varied marking of modality across languages, source of information plays 
an important role, and many languages have made it a part of their grammar. 
 
 
3. Information sources 
 
The types of evidence we may have for our statements constitute, expectedly, an important part of 
studies of evidentiality. Many classifications of information sources have also been proposed, but 
despite the differences in how the different information sources are distinguished from each other, 
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the discussed evidence types are largely the same. Two slightly different classifications are found 
below (see also, e.g., Willet 1988): 
 
Direct/personal (=attested, witnessed, firsthand, confirmative) 
- Participatory/endophoric; common knowledge 
- Visual (with subtypes) 
- Non-visual (sensory) 
Indirect/personal 
- Inferential (based on observed results) 
- Presumptive (based on plausible reasoning) (common knowledge) 
Indirect/non-personal (secondhand) 
- Reported (with subtypes) 
(Plungian 2010: 37) 
 
Aikhenvald (2004: 63f) 
1. Visual evidence 
2. Non-visual sensory evidence 
3. Inference 
4. Assumption 
5. Hearsay 
6. Quotative 
 
The two taxonomies given above differ from each other in how the different information sources are 
distinguished, and there are also some differences in the number of categories. For example, Plungian 
considers participatory (egophoric) evidence and common knowledge (in the first sense referring to 
pieces of information that have become the speaker’s internal information) in his classification, while 
these are lacking on Aikhenvald’s list. The classifications also differ from each other in that Plungian 
makes his distinctions more explicitly based on the (in)direct and (non-)personal nature of the 
evidence, while Aikhenvald is rather merely a list of possible information sources.1  
The evidence types discussed above rather well cover the ways in which humans gather 
information about the surrounding (non-linguistic) world. The discussed categories are also rather 
self-explanatory in many cases (even though their actual use may deviate from their basic semantics, 
                                                          
1 Aikhenvald also discusses the differences between the information sources elsewhere in her book. 
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as shown in Section 5). Participatory evidence comprises cases where the speaker is making a claim 
based on his/her own (volitional) participation in an event, as in ‘I am writing this paper’ (see Floyd 
et al (eds.) 2018 for detailed discussion of egophoricity in different languages). Common knowledge 
refers to cases where the speaker is making a claim based on a piece of information that has become 
a part of his/her established world view without having any other evidence for his/her claim as s/he 
speaks. Typical examples comprise, e.g., mathematical and geographical facts and pieces of evidence 
that we know, e.g., of our good friends, e.g., John and Lisa have two children (see Kittilä 2019 for a 
more detailed discussion of general knowledge). Visual evidence refers to something we have 
witnessed visually. Non-visual sensory evidence covers all other types of sensory evidence. In 
languages with dedicated non-visual sensory markers, one marker usually codes all instances of this 
evidence type (as in Oksapmin, see Lawrence 1987: 55-56). Some languages (e.g., Tundra Nenets, 
see Jalava 2017) have a dedicated marker for auditive evidence, but no language is known to date that 
would have a specific marker for gustatory, tactile or olfactory evidence. Inference and assumption 
are two slightly difference manifestations of personal and indirect evidence (see, e.g., De Haan 2001 
and Plungian 2010: 37). In both cases, the speaker is making a claim based on some evidence that is 
not directly related to the state-of-affairs s/he is referring to. For example, we may infer or assume 
that Lisa has left, when we see that her coat is gone. In this case, we directly witness the coat being 
gone, but we have not seen Lisa leave. Inference and assumption differ from each other in that 
inference is usually based on some concrete and observable evidence, while prototypical assumption 
is based on, e.g., the speaker’s general knowledge about the world (see, e.g., Aikhenvald 2004: 63). 
Finally, reported/hearsay evidence covers cases where the speaker’s evidence is indirect and non-
personal, i.e. the speaker has no evidence of his/her own, but s/he has to rely on secondhand 
information. Reported evidence can further be divided into two types depending on whether the 
source of information is known/mentioned or not; the source is known for quotation, but it is unknown 
for (general) hearsay. 
The different evidence types illustrated above differ from each other in how objective or 
subjective they are, and in whether the speaker’s own evaluation plays a role in how a certain piece 
of evidence is interpreted. Visual evidence is very objective in nature, and it is very hard to deny 
something we have actually seen. On the other hand, other instances of sensory evidence are more 
subjective in nature. For example, if we hear a sound or smell something, we may not be sure of their 
causes, and we may be less willing to take responsibility for our claims. Choosing between inference 
and assumption always involves a subjective component, because the speaker opts for using either of 
these evidentials based on the reliability of the available evidence from his/her own perspective. The 
objective vs. subjective nature of the evidence thus correlates rather directly with the direct vs. 
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indirect nature of the evidence; there is clearly less variation and subjectivity for direct evidence. 
Finally, we may note that the nature and reliability of evidence are not constant. For example, a certain 
piece of information may originally be based on hearsay (i.e. indirect and thus unreliable) evidence, 
but once it becomes general knowledge for us it becomes highly reliable evidence. In other words, 
the context determines the nature of the evidence in these cases, not the semantics of the given piece 
information directly. 
The different information sources discussed above form a clear hierarchy. Participatory, or 
visual evidence (depending on the exact classification) can be viewed as the most direct and most 
reliable evidence type, while reported/hearsay evidence constitutes the least direct and non-reliable 
information. The speaker can usually take (full) responsibility for his/her claims based on his/her own 
actions, or visual evidence, but s/he cannot take any responsibility for claims based on hearsay; they 
are always someone else’s information, and the speaker may only choose how reliable s/he finds the 
evidence to be. Moreover, the hierarchy is also relevant for pragmatics in that the speaker is expected 
to use the most direct evidence possible for his/her claims (see Faller 2002). This means that whenever 
direct (personal) evidence is available the speaker will use it for his/her claims if there is no reason 
not to. Conversely, whenever the speaker resorts to any type of less direct evidence, the hearer usually 
implies that the speaker does not have more direct evidence available, which probably affects the way 
in which the hearer interprets the speaker’s utterances (e.g., whether s/he can trust the conveyed 
information). In case the speaker has multiple types of evidence available, s/he usually opts for using 
the most direct reliable evidence. The co-operative principle and Grice’s maxims are highly relevant 
in this regard; do not say anything you lack adequate evidence for. This follows because the speaker’s 
goal is to convince the hearer of his/her claims and whenever this is not possible based on direct and 
reliable evidence, it is highlighted linguistically.  It is in order to note that even though visual evidence 
in general constitutes the most reliable evidence type, different states-of-affairs vary according to 
which type of evidence is best regarded as the best possible evidence for them. For example, for any 
type of sound, auditive evidence is naturally more reliable than visual evidence. 
Two further notes on the pragmatics of evidentials and information sources are in order. First, 
the division of labor between implicit (zero) and explicit coding can be said to have a clear pragmatic 
basis. In all the languages, where zero is used for coding any type of evidence, it always codes (at 
least) direct and other types of highly reliable evidence. This is the case, for example, in Magar, as 
shown in (1) (see also LaPolla 2003: 199 for Qiang): 
 
Magar (Grunow-Hårsta 2007: 156) 
(1) (a)  hose   taraɦ-a 
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D.DEM arrive-PST 
‘He has arrived.’ (I see him.) 
(b) hose  taraɦ-sa 
D.DEM arrive-INFR 
‘He has arrived.’ (I see his bag.) 
(c) hose  taraɦ  ta 
D.DEM arrive REP 
   ‘He has arrived.’ (They say.) 
 
In (1a), the speaker’s claim is based on direct evidence and there is no explicit marking for this 
evidence type. On the other hand, inference and hearsay evidence are explicitly marked. 
 Zero coding of direct evidence follows quite naturally. First, direct evidence is typically readily 
available when we speak of states-of-affairs we are witnessing. Also the hearer can thus easily infer 
the type of evidence we have for our statements, and we may also share the same information. In 
languages such as Finnish that code evidentiality optionally by particles, zero coding is default and 
occurs in all the cases where the speaker finds the evidence reliable; only less reliable/direct instances 
of evidence are marked explicitly. Second, it is most natural to make claims based on something we 
have high certainty of. The degree of certainty is highest for direct evidence, and we may also say 
that communication runs most smoothly in case we base our claims on information that we find 
reliable (see the above-mentioned Grice’s maxim). In principle, any type of information could be the 
least marked evidence type formally, but the previously mentioned pragmatic reasons speak for the 
unmarked nature of direct evidence. The hearer expects the speaker to use the best possible evidence 
available to him/her, and what is expected does not need to be highlighted. 
 Second, the nature of attested evidentiality systems along with the emergence of evidentials is 
largely pragmatically determined, i.e. communicative needs explain why certain systems exist while 
others do not. First, basically all languages with some form of grammaticalized evidentiality have a 
hearsay (or a general second-hand) evidential regardless of the size of the given evidentiality system 
(see Aikhenvald 2004: Chapter 2). On the other hand, there are no languages where the only 
grammaticalized evidential would be a direct evidential (coding any type of direct evidence). Purely 
logically, both of these types are equally plausible, but the former system better makes important 
contextually relevant distinctions. For example, it may be of the utmost importance to highlight the 
fact that the speaker’s claim is not based on his/her own evidence. Direct evidence, for its part, may 
be contextually present, which makes systems that can only refer to this kind of evidence explicitly 
rather dysfunctional. Certain differences are communicatively relevant, which accounts for the 
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occurrence of hearsay evidentials. The emergence of evidentials can be explained largely along 
similar lines. The first evidential to emerge is usually (or even always) some kind of hearsay/second-
hand evidential, i.e., languages first make the most relevant distinctions by marking the evidence type 
furthest from the expected type. Examples of languages whose only grammaticalized is some kind of 
hearsay evidential include, e.g., Estonian (Kersten Lehismets, p.c.) and Ayutla Mixe (Romero-
Méndez 2008: 245). Semantically more specific evidentials (such as factual evidentials and 
assumptives) are usually attested only in larger systems, i.e. they develop when language already has 
a means of dealing with more significant differences. We may thus say that the coding of information 
sources is semantically motivated (the attested evidentials largely covers the ways in which humans 
gather information about the world), while evidentiality systems and the emergence of evidentials are 
rather pragmatically motivated. 
 
 
4. Engagement, epistemic authority and right to know 
 
Even though evidentiality is primarily about the speaker’s information source, which is in many cases 
rather constant in nature, other features contribute to which of the possible evidentials the speaker 
chooses for his/her statement. Engagement, epistemic authority and right to know, discussed below, 
make an important contribution to this. These are all strongly pragmatic aspects of evidentiality whose 
use can be explained only by referring to pragmatics (e.g., context), semantics of evidentials makes 
a contribution, but does not alone suffice for explaining their use exhaustively. 
First, even though evidentiality primarily concerns the speaker’s evidence for his/her claim, the 
speaker also considers what s/he expects the listener(s) to know when choosing his/her evidentials. 
Evans, Bergqvist and San Roque (2018:1) label this phenomenon engagement and define it as a 
grammaticalised means for encoding the relative mental directedness of speaker and addressee 
towards an entity or state of affairs (other terms for similar phenomenon include, e.g., multiple 
perspective (Evans 2006) and intersubjectivity (Verhagen 2005)). For example, the speaker may use 
different evidentials depending on whether s/he expects the hearer to have access to the same 
information or not. This has been grammaticalized in languages such as Andoke and Kogi that have 
distinct evidential markers for shared and private knowledge, as shown in (2) and (3): 
 
Andoke (Landaburu 2007, as cited in Evans et al 2018: 5) 
(2) a.  páa   b-ʌ       ʌ-pó’kə̃-i 
already  +SPKR+ADDR.ENGAG-3SG.INAN  3SG.INAN-light-AGR 
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‘The day is dawning (as we can both see).’ (shared knowledge) 
b.  páa   kẽ-ø       ʌ-pó’kə̃-i  
already  +SPKR-ADDR.ENGAG-3SG.INAN  3SG.INAN-light-AGR 
‘The day is dawning (as I witness, but which you were not aware of).’ (non-shared 
  knowledge) 
 
Kogi (Bergqvist 2016: 2) 
(3) a. kwisa-té  na-nuk-kú 
   dance-IMPF SPKR.ASYM-be.LOC-1SG 
   ‘I am/was dancing.’ {informing} 
      b. kwisa-té ni-nuk-kú 
   dance-IMPF SPKR.SYM-be.LOC-1SG 
   ‘I am/was dancing.’ {confirming} 
 
Andoke has two evidential markers whose use is determined by whether the speaker expects the 
hearer to have access to the same information or not; in (2a) speaker and hearer share the same 
information, while in (2b) this is not the case. Kogi also has two markers that Bergqvist (2016: 2) 
defines as follows:  na- means that ‘the speaker knows e and expects the addressee to be unaware of 
e’, and ni- means that ‘the speaker knows e and expects the addressee to know e too’. In Wutun 
(Sandman 2016: 225), for its part, factual evidentials are used whenever the speaker expects the hearer 
to have access to the same information s/he has, which is the case for example for pieces of general 
knowledge shared by the whole community. In all of these cases, we cannot capture the whole 
meaning of the given elements solely by referring to the speaker’s information source, but the 
addressee’s evidence also needs to be considered. In fact, in (2) and (3), the information sources are 
different, in (2) the speaker has visual evidence for his/her statement, while in (3) s/he is using ego-
evidence. This lends more support to the fact that the use of these elements is determined by whether 
or not the information is shared, not by its nature. 
 Engagement is related more generally to epistemic authority. Epistemic authority refers to the 
person who has the best and most direct evidence for a given piece of information, in laypersons’ 
terms, “who knows best”. For example, in (2b), the speaker is clearly the epistemic authority, because 
s/has direct access to the given information, while in (2a), epistemic authority is shared, which is 
manifested in the speaker’s choice of evidential. More generally, we may say that by using a direct 
evidential the speaker usually assumes epistemic authority (and the right to know), while reported 
evidentials shift the epistemic authority to an unspecified (general hearsay evidentials) or specified 
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(quotatives) source. The notion of epistemic authority is highly relevant to the use of ego-evidentials 
as well. Whenever the speaker chooses an ego-evidential for his/her claims, s/he assumes epistemic 
authority. This is very natural given the ego-evidentials’ primary function of coding the speaker’s 
volitional involvement in a state-of-affairs, which makes the speaker the epistemic authority by 
default. Ego-evidentials most naturally occur with first person referents due to their semantics, but 
they are also possible in cases where the speaker assumes epistemic authority over other people’s 
actions, as in (4): 
 
 Wutun (Sandman 2016: 224) 
(4) ni gu liang-ge  da jhang-de  hanqai-la  da gu 
  2SG 3SG two together-REF then today-ATTR except-ABL  then 3SG 
  be-lai-yek  caixi-la  da gu be-lai-yek  ni haipa-de 
NEG-come-EGO tonight-ABL then 3SG NEG-come-EGO 2SG fear-NMLZ 
bai-yek  sho-ma  
EXIST.NEG-EGO   QUOT 
‘As for you and him, from today he will not come (anymore); after tonight he will not 
come (anymore). You don’t have to be afraid (the lama) said’. (WutunWT09Monks_4.) 
 
In Wutun culture, lamas are seen as high religious authorities who have access to information 
unavailable to normal people (Sandman 2016: 224). Therefore, they may assume epistemic authority 
also in cases where they are speaking of other people’s actions. The relation of ego-evidentials to 
epistemic authority is further manifested in the fact that non-ego evidentials may be used with first 
person when the speaker cannot assume full epistemic authority, as shown in (5): 
 
Tsafiki (Barbacoan, Dickinson 2000: 412) 
(5) a.  la  kuchi=ka tote-yo-e 
   1MASC pig=ACC kill-EGO-DECL 
   ‘I killed the pig (intentionally).’ 
  b. la  kuchi=ka tote-i-e 
   1MASC pig=ACC kill-NONEGO-DECL 
   ‘I killed the pig (unintentionally).’ 
  c. la  kuchi=ka tote-i-nu-e 
   1MASC pig=ACC kill-NONEGO-INFR/MIR-DECL 
‘I killed the pig (unintentionally, I infer it on the basis of indirect evidence).’ 
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In (5a), the speaker uses an ego-evidential, because s/he is referring to an action that s/he has 
performed volitionally and that s/he has controlled, which makes him/her the epistemic authority. In 
(5b-c), the speaker’s involvement in the event has been involuntary, which is manifested in the choice 
of evidentials. Due to the lack of volitionality, the speaker cannot assume epistemic authority, and a 
non-ego evidential is chosen. 
 Epistemic authority is very naturally related to first person, because speaker knows best what 
concerns him/her. Moreover, epistemic authority is also directly related to the use of evidentials with 
second person. Similarly to the first person (as in (5)), second person is unarguably the epistemic 
authority over his/her own actions. The distribution of epistemic authority in utterances concerning 
second person also has the consequence that the use of direct evidentials is generally viewed as 
pragmatically marked. This follows very naturally, because the hearer unarguably has the most direct 
access to the relevant information, which makes the speaker’s evidence always less direct. The use 
of direct evidentials yields the impression that the speaker is assuming epistemic authority, which 
s/he usually cannot have. The use of indirect evidentials is thus more natural, because in this case the 
speaker is making a claim concerning the addressee, but is not claiming epistemic authority, but is, 
for example making an inference or assuming something.  For example, the use of indirect evidentials 
in cases such as ‘you are sick’ and ‘you are happy’ appears more natural, because the speaker may 
(at best) have sensory evidence for his/her claim, while the hearer’s evidence is always ego-evidence. 
 Because speech-act participants are, naturally, present in the speech event, both of them are 
epistemic authorities of their own actions. Third person is drastically different as regards claiming 
epistemic authority. Neither speech-act participant is by default the epistemic authority for claims 
regarding third person referents, but this is always contextually determined, and the participant with 
the most direct evidence available is usually accorded higher degree of epistemic authority. This 
follows also from the lack of ego-evidence for both participants; as speech-act participants both first 
and second person referents have ego-evidence for claims concerning themselves, but this cannot be 
the case for third person referents. With third person, thus any evidential is equally possible, and the 
choice is determined by the type of evidence available to the speaker. Epistemic authority is less 
relevant, but it also plays a role in that for using a direct evidential the speaker must have access to 
direct information. With first and second person, either indirect (first person) or direct (second person) 
evidentials are usually deemed less felicitous due to the distribution of epistemic authority (see 
Aikhenvald 2004: Chapter 7 for a detailed discussion of person and evidentials). 
 Epistemic authority is further closely related to the right to know. With first and second person, 
it is obvious that the speaker or the hearer has right to know, but for third person there is variation in 
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this regard; who has the best possible evidence available and who can thus claim responsibility for a 
given claim. Illustrative examples are found in Shipibo-Konibo and Tariana. In Shipibo-Konibo, 
shamans use direct evidential for their dreams, while laypersons use reportative evidential 
(Valenzuela 2003: 51). In Tariana, for its part, shamans use visual evidential for their utterances and 
other people also use visual evidential when referring to information received from shamans 
(Aikhenvald 2003: 138). In Quechua, shamans may use direct evidential when referring to folkolore, 
while other people must use other evidentials (Floyd 1999 and Martina Faller, p.c.). These differences 
follow, because shamans are believed to have direct access to the denoted pieces of information, 
which also grants them the right to use direct evidentials. Similar differences are attested also, for 
example, for factual evidentials and also for reportatives. Factual evidentials code information that 
the speaker finds highly reliable in that the denoted piece of information has become a part of the 
speaker’s established world view. Only those who have absolute (subjective) certainty of a given 
piece of information may refer to it via factual evidential, or put another way, the speaker uses a 
factual evidential only when s/he has the (contextually determined) right to do so. 
Right to know is also related to the use of reportatives, especially quotatives; who has right to 
quote whose information, in other words whose voice are we entitled to speak with? The right to 
know does not apply to general hearsay evidentials, because we are not making claims based on any 
specific person’s information when using them. On the other hand, with quotatives we may need to 
consider other people’s face and/or we may need to think whether we have the right to refer to a state-
of-affairs via other people’s information. By using hearsay evidentials we shift the responsibility to 
a third party whose identity is unknown. Quotatives also shift the responsibility away from the 
speaker, but to a specific, named source, which means that s/he needs to take the quoted source’s face 
into account. The functional differences between hearsay and quotative evidentials also explain their 
use in different genres. As such, both evidentials may be used in most genres, but hearsay evidentials 
are less felicitous in, e.g., newspaper texts, at least in languages such as Finnish, where evidentiality 
is coded primarily by evidential particles. This probably follows, because in this genre truth is 
important and the hearer needs to be able to check the truth value of the claims made, which is not 
possible in the case of general hearsay evidentials. The use of quotatives is also related to polyphony 
and different voices, because the use of quotatives brings other people’s voices into the discourse. 
Whose words are we bringing into the discourse and why (see Roulet 1996 for polyphony)? The use 
of quotatives also underline the fact that not only the speaker’s evidence is important, but other 
people’s information also play an important role. 
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5. Non-evidential uses of evidentials 
 
Even though evidentials are labeled based on the evidence type they primarily code, their exact 
function varies, in some cases drastically, according to the context they are used in. For example, 
visual evidentials may also be used for other types of sensory evidence, or any kind of highly reliable 
(direct) information. Inferential evidentials rather typically acquire other functions, such as mirativity, 
and the expression of lack of volitionality (Curnow 2003). Inferential and assumptive evidentials can 
in principle be distinguished based on the nature of (indirect) evidence the speaker has for his/her 
claim, but the choice between these two evidentials typically comprises a strong subjective 
component as well; the speaker chooses either inferential or assumptive evidential according to how 
reliable s/he finds the available evidence to be (inferentials are used for more reliable evidence, e.g., 
Aikhenvald 2004: 63). Below some of the central extended/non-evidential uses of evidentials will be 
discussed. The discussion proceeds from cases where the difference to the original function is rather 
small to clearly non-evidential functions.   
 The attested (grammaticalized) evidentials, as noted above, rather well cover the basic ways in 
which humans gather information about the non-linguistic world. However, we may also make claims 
based on other types of evidence, such as general knowledge and folklore, which are rather rarely 
coded by distinct evidentials (see Kittilä 2019 for general knowledge). General knowledge is 
commonly coded by ego- or direct evidentials, while reportative and indirect evidentials are typical 
of folklore (see, e.g., Aikhenvald 2004: 56). This distribution of markers is rather directly accounted 
for by the nature of the evidence types in question. General knowledge (or facts) is highly reliable 
evidence, which explains the use of the most direct evidential available (ego- or direct/visual 
evidential depending on the language) for its coding. On the other hand, folklore is typically oral 
information that is passed on from generation to generation, which renders reportatives and indirect 
evidentials natural for its coding. Folklore may be seen as highly reliable information due to its nature, 
but normal people are not allowed to take responsibility for it, which explains its formal treatment. 
 In addition to coding some less frequent evidence types, the basic semantics of evidentials is 
also exploited in ways not as directly explained by referring to the type of evidence the speaker uses. 
A very good example of this is illustrated by avoiding/claiming responsibility. As noted above, the 
speaker can take responsibility for claims based on direct (especially visual) evidence, while this is 
not possible for hearsay evidence. Consequently, hearsay (and also other indirect) evidentials are 
readily available for responsibility avoidance. The speaker may thus resort to indirect evidentials 
whenever s/he wants to shift the responsibility to an unspecified source away from him/herself. 
Indirect evidentials may also be used to express doubt, which is also in line with the indirect and non-
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personal nature of hearsay evidence. In these cases, the use of, e.g., a hearsay evidential is not 
motivated by the nature of evidence actually available, but the contextually appropriate evidential is 
chosen for other, pragmatic, reasons. The hearer may either interpret a given utterance literally, or 
s/he may evaluate the evidence contextually and draw conclusions based on that. From the speaker’s 
perspective the exact reading is not that relevant, because s/he can nevertheless avoid responsibility 
by using a less direct evidential. 
Finally, evidentials have functions not in any direct way related to the type of information 
source.  First, mirativity, here understood in line with, e.g., DeLancey 1997, 2001, 2012, and 
Hengeveld and Olbertz 2012 as unanticipated/surprising information, is frequently coded by 
evidentials. Two examples are provided in (6) and (7):  
 
Turkish (Aksu-Koç & Slobin 1982: 187) 
(6) a. Kemal gel-di 
   Kemal come-PST 
   ’Kemal came’ (neutral for evidentiality) 
b. Kemal gel-miș 
   Kemal come-MIR 
   ’Kemal came’ (mirative/evidential) 
 
Jarawara (Aikhenvald 2004: 197) 
(7) Okomobi faha  hi-fa-hani ama-ke 
Okomobi water  Oc-drink-IMM.P.NONFIRSTH.F.EXT-DECL.F 
‘Okomobi (to his surprise) drank water’. 
 
In both (6b) and (7b), the piece of information in question presents unanticipated information for the 
speaker, which is coded by an evidential marker available in the language. In Turkish, the mirative 
marker illustrated in (6b) may also express hearsay or inferential evidence, while in Jarawara a non-
firsthand evidential is used for this purpose. Especially, the extension from inference to mirativity is 
easily accounted for, because inference always involves uncertainty and unpreparedness for the 
denoted state-of-affairs, which is an essential part of the semantics of mirativity (but whose use is 
always determined pragmatically by the context). Mirativity and evidentiality both concern the 
evidence the speaker has for his/her claim, but in drastically different ways. Evidentiality is directly 
related to the nature of the speaker’s information source, while mirativity concerns the relation of the 
speaker’s information to his/her prior knowledge. The exact nature of the evidence type is not 
16 
 
important. In addition to languages like Turkish and Jarawara, there are also languages where 
mirativity is expressed by distinct morphemes (such as Kham (Watters 2002: 288)), but these lie 
outside the scope of this paper, even though these languages provide us with best possible evidence 
for the existence of mirativity as a linguistic category.2 They, however, do not tell us anything about 
extended uses of evidentials. 
 Another frequent non-evidential function associated with evidentials is illustrated by lack of 
control/volition. This comprises here, expectedly, cases where the speaker does not exercise (full) 
control over the denoted state-of-affairs, and/or s/he is not involved in it volitionally. Two examples 
are illustrated in (8) and (9): 
 
Tariana (Aikhenvald 2004: 223-224) 
(8) a. kaɾapi nu-thuka-ka  
   plate  1SG-break-REC.P.VIS 
   ’I have cracked a plate intentionally.’ (e.g. I was angry or hated the plate.) 
  b. kaɾapi nu-thuka-mahka  
   plate  1SG-break-REC.P.NONVIS 
   ’I have broken a plate unintentionally.’ 
 
Northern Akhvakh (Nakh-Daghestanian, Creissels 2008: 11) 
(9) a. de-de  istaka b-iq’w-āda 
  1SG-ERG glass  N-break-CAUS.PRF.EGO 
  ’I broke the glass.’ (lit. ’I made the glass break.’) 
 b. di-gune  istaka b-iq’w-ari 
  1SG o-ABL glass  N-break-PRF.NONEGO 
  ‘I broke the glass unintentionally.’ (lit. ‘The glass broke from me.’) 
 
In (8-9a), the denoted event is viewed as volitionally instigated, while in (8-9b) the same event is 
viewed as non-volitional. In both languages, this difference is manifested in the evidential employed; 
in Tariana visual evidential changes to non-visual evidential, while in Northern Akhvakh, ego-
evidential is replaced by a non-ego evidential. In other words, in both languages, the most direct 
evidential is replaced by a less direct one. In Northern Akhvakh, the change in the evidential is also 
                                                          
2 Recently, the status and the essence of mirativity and mirative markers has been debated, and some 
scholars do not view mirativity as an independent category (see, e.g., Hill 2012), while others do 
(DeLancey 2012, Hengeveld & Olbertz 2012). 
17 
 
accompanied by a change in case marking of A. In Tariana, the use of non-visual evidential implies 
that the speaker has not witnessed his/her own action, which yields a non-volitional reading. In 
Northern Akhvakh, the use of ego-evidentials implies that the speaker cannot take full responsibility 
for his claim, which also holds for involuntarily instigated actions. 
Lack of volition is related to mirativity in that mirativity may also be motivated by lack of 
volition especially with first person; something we do not plan is usually also unexpected. However, 
in this chapter these notions are explicitly distinguished for two reasons. First, mirativity is a broader 
concept, and it comprises any type of unexpectedness, not only those cases where this follows from 
lack of volition. Second, lack of volition is usually restricted to first person (at least when expressed 
by evidentials), while miratives are possible with any person. This also follows quite naturally, since 
any state-of-affairs can be unexpected to us (depending on context), while we can only be sure about 
our own volitionality. In both cases, we are dealing with the speaker’s subjective evaluation, but in 
different ways. With (lack of) volition we are judging our own actions and their volitionality, which 
is naturally best known to us. As regards mirativity, subjectivity means that we evaluate whether a 
state-of-affairs is anticipated or not based on our own expectations. Other people’s actions and their 
(un)expectedness from their perspective is not relevant. There is also formal evidence for the 
distinction; evidentials do not seem to acquire non-volitional readings with other persons (see, 
Curnow 2003 for a more detailed discussion). 
 The uses of evidentials discussed previously are clearly non-evidential in the sense that no 
reference to a specific information source is made in any of the cases discussed in (6)-(9). However, 
both mirativity and lack of volition can be regarded as rather natural extensions of the evidential’s 
primary meaning, where pragmatics also plays a central role. For example, inference means that the 
speaker is making a claim based on something that is only indirectly related to the state-of-affairs 
s/he is referring to. In many cases, the speaker only has evidence for the result, and s/he needs to infer 
what has led to it, which is always open to unexpectedness in that the speaker’s inference may be 
wrong. For example, if the speaker notices that Lisa’s coat is gone, s/he may view this as reliable 
enough evidence for a claim such as ‘Lisa has left’, even though the actual reason may be something 
completely different (e.g., Lisa’s coat was stolen). In a similar vein, mirativity expresses 
unexpectedness. The speaker has some evidence s/he is using as a basis for his/her claim, but what 
actually occurs is contrary to the speaker’s evidence. The basic semantics of evidentials is relevant to 
the type of non-evidential functions evidentials acquire. As noted previously, inferentials are rather 
closely related to lack of volition and/or mirativity. On the other hand, reportative evidentials easily 
lend themselves to functions related to avoidance of responsibility. 
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6. Acquisition of evidentials 
 
Acqusition of evidentials has not been studied in great detail, which follows at least to some extent 
from the fact that in general evidentiality as a notion has not been the target of extensive research yet 
(see Fitneva 2018: 186). Another fact that may be relevant in this regard is that evidentials are more 
usually attested (as a grammatical category) in lesser studied languages (with lower number of 
speakers) whose research is more typically focused on the description of the language, and acquisition 
is in the background, and may thus pose challenges for any kind of detailed study. However, some 
studies will be briefly discussed below. 
 Even though the number of studies on acquisition of evidentiality is not very high in number, 
the conducted studies do reveal some general trends. Aksu-Koç (1988) has shown that children 
acquiring Turkish learn to use the direct evidential at about eighteen months, whereas they start using 
the indirect evidential some months later. Later appearance of indirect evidentials has been reported 
also, e.g., for Korean (Choi 1991), Japanese (Matsui and Yamamoto 2013), Tibetan (de Villiers et al 
1999) and Quechua (Courtney 1999). Pillow (1989) has shown that children first learn the relevance 
of visual evidence for statements, and only a couple of years later they realize that inference (i.e. 
indirect evidence) is a valid source of information as well (Sodian & Wimmer 1987). 
In addition to showing, perhaps expectedly, that indirect evidentials appear later in the 
children’s speech, their functions are also relevant as regards their acquisition. For example, Turkish 
learning children first start to use the indirect evidential -mɪş to mark new/unexpected information, 
and a little later the form appears in storytelling and for inference based on current results. Finally (at 
round 36 months of age), children start using the marker for coding hearsay evidence (Aksu-Koç 
1988). For Korean, the children first distinguish between assimilated and unassimilated information, 
which is followed by hearsay evidentials (Choi 1991, 1995). It is perhaps noteworthy that inferential 
evidentials were not productively used by children in Choi’s data. 
 The results of the studies briefly discussed above are rather expected, and they reflect the 
general tendency that what is easy is acquired/learnt before what is more complex. For example, 
direct evidence, especially visual evidence, is directly observable, which makes it easy to use it as 
evidence for one’s claims. In a similar vein, children first learn words that are a part of their immediate 
surroundings, such as ‘mummy’, ‘daddy’ and ‘cat/dog’, for example. Direct evidence is also less 
complex in that it only involves direct observation of the event we are referring to, whereas inference 
entails combining direct observation with something that is not directly present. Similarly, learning 
to use a verb correctly requires that the child can combine a concrete referent with some kind of 
action. Learning to use the Turkish indirect evidential first as a marker of new/unexpected information 
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is in line with this; unexpected information is also directly observable and available, and does not 
require any kind of combination of current observation with something that is not available as we 
speak. 
 Acquisition of evidentials reflects rather directly the general tendencies of language acquisition; 
what is easier is acquired first. One thing that is worth mentioning in this regard is the fact that hearsay 
evidentials seem to be among those evidential functions that are learnt last. This is interesting in light 
of the fact that, as noted above, hearsay evidentials are among the most common evidentials across 
languages and they also seem to be among the first (grammaticalized) evidentials that emerge in 
languages (see, e.g., Aikhenvald 2004: Chapter 7). There is thus a clear discrepancy in how early 
hearsay evidentials emerge in language acquisition and language change. This difference is, however, 
probably rather easily explained by pragmatics and communicative needs. When a child is acquiring 
his/her native language(s), s/he needs to be able to get his/her message through in some way first, 
whereby evidentials play a less important role. On the other hand, in adult communication, features 
such as politeness, face and reliability are relevant, which renders it important to be able to distinguish 
one’s own information from other people’s information. This readily explain the early emergence of 
hearsay evidentials, which make this possible and also enable the speaker to avoid taking 
responsibility for his/her claims. 
 
 
7. Summary 
 
The present chapter has discussed evidentiality from different perspectives. Evidentiality was defined 
first and foremostly as a semantic category whose primary function is to code the source of 
information the speaker is using for his/her claims, but as has been shown context and other pragmatic 
aspects also play a role for how evidentials are actually used. Languages can be divided according to 
whether they express evidentiality obligatorily as a part of their grammar, or whether this is done 
optionally, e.g. by lexical verb or evidential particles. Traditionally, most studies on evidentiality 
have focused on languages with obligatorily evidentiality, but more and more research is nowadays 
conducted on languages whose evidentiality expression is optional. 
 Evidentiality is closely related to other categories, most notably modality (especially epistemic 
modality). Both evidentiality and modality are related to how likely the speaker finds the state-of-
affairs s/he is referring to. The certainty is, however, motivated differently. Modality is primarily 
about the speaker’s (subjective) certainty, which naturally makes certainty an integral part of any 
modal expression. On the other hand, degree of certainty is rather an implication for evidentiality; the 
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state-of-affairs is more certain if the speaker has direct evidence for it. Modality is more subjective 
and evidentiality more objective in nature. 
 Even though any marker that we wish to label as a genuine evidential marker must be able to 
code some kind of evidence, evidential markers serve an array of other functions as well, and in some 
cases the use of in principle objective evidentials comprises a subjective component. This is most 
visible for epistemic authority and/or right to know. First of all, people have different sources of 
information, and depending on the situation some speakers know certain things better than others. 
This is most evident for speech-act participants that always have epistemic authority for their own 
actions. Second, in some cultures, for example high religious authorities are seen to have more direct 
access to information than normal people. They may thus use direct evidentials for pieces of 
information for which normal people must use indirect evidentials. 
Finally, in addition to their basic function (according to which evidentials are labeled), many 
evidentials have acquired other functions that, however, are somehow motivated by their basic 
semantics. First of all, not all evidence types have a dedicated evidential available for their coding, 
but for example, in many languages the most direct evidentials of a language are also used for coding 
general knowledge/facts. Second, speakers may exploit the basic semantics of evidentials, and for 
example, hearsay evidentials may be used for avoiding responsibility also in cases where the speaker 
has more direct evidence for his/her claim. Third, evidentials have also acquired functions that are 
not directly to the information source. The most notable of these functions are illustrated by mirativity 
and the expression of lack of volitionality. 
 
Abbreviations 
 
ACC  Accusative 
ADDR Addressee 
AGR  Agreement 
ABL  Ablative 
ASYM Asymmetric 
ATTR Attributive 
CAUS Causative 
D.DEM Distal demonstrative 
DECL Declarative 
EGO  Ego-evidential 
ERG  Ergative 
EXIST Existential 
EXT  Extent 
F  Feminine 
IMM.P Immediate past 
IMPF Imperfective 
INAN Inanimate 
INFR Inferential 
LOC  Locative 
MASC Masculine 
MIR  Mirative 
N  Neuter 
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NEG  Negation 
NMLZ Nominalizer 
NONEGO Non-ego evidential 
NONFIRSTH Non-firsthand 
NONVIS Non-visual 
o  O-like argument 
Oc   Marker of O-construction type 
PRF  Perfective 
PST  Past tense 
QUOT Quotative 
REC.P Recent past 
REP  Reported 
REF  Referential 
SG  Singular 
SPKR Speaker 
SYM  Symmetric 
VIS  Visual 
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